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In October 2009, the academic health research commu-nity and the pharmaceutical industry were broughtcloser together with the appointment of Dr. Bernard Pri-
gent, vice-president of Pfizer Canada, to the Governing
Council of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research
(CIHR). This bridging of the two worlds has stirred up con-
siderable debate before the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Health,1,2 in letters to CMAJ3 and in an  online
petition that garnered more than 4400 signatures.4
There are at least two distinct and vocal camps in the
debate: those categorically in favour (including the federal
minister of health and the president of CIHR) and those
opposed to the appointment of someone from the pharmaceu-
tical industry (including several senior Canada Research
Chairs with a specialization in ethics4 and senior persons
within CIHR5). There are also some who support the appoint-
ment of a person with professional ties to the pharmaceutical
industry, but not to this particular company (Pfizer) because
of its history of ethical and legal violations.6
An important precept borrowed from administrative law
may aid in illustrating some of the issues in this debate: the
concept of reasonable apprehension of bias. When applied to
these circumstances, it cuts through the various arguments to
suggest the appointment is indefensible. I’ll explain why. But
first I will briefly summarize the roles of CIHR and its Gov-
erning Council, as well as the arguments made thus far.
CIHR is a statutorily created corporate agency of the federal
government. Its objective is “to excel … in the creation of new
knowledge and its translation into improved health for Canadi-
ans, more effective health services and products and a strength-
ened Canadian health care system.” The Governing Council
oversees the direction and management of CIHR by developing
strategic directions, goals and policies, evaluating the agency’s
overall performance, and approving its budget. CIHR is in -
tended to function at arm’s length from  government.7
The first argument of those in support of the appointment is
that the voice of the pharmaceutical industry will be an invalu-
able enhancement to the ability of CIHR to meet the needs of
the Canadian public. It is important that CIHR be seen to be
serving Canadian interests in commercialization and economic
development, which are indeed parts of the agency’s mandate.
There may not have been enough attention paid to these mat-
ters, and this appointment will help to fill the gap.8
Second, Dr. Prigent has great credentials: his qualifications
are strong, and he is highly respected. He has considerable
experience in commercialization and in pharmaceutical devel-
opment. He chairs the Scientific Advisory Committee of
Canada’s Rx&D Health Research Foundation, an association
of research-based patent-holding pharmaceutical companies;
he co-chairs the research working group of Montréal InVivo,
the life sciences and health technologies cluster of the Mon-
tréal metropolitan area; and he serves on a number of national
health-related committees. He has been appointed as an indi-
vidual because of his skills and experience.
Third, Dr. Prigent will be one voice among many at the
Governing Council and will not promote his personal agenda
or that of his company or the pharmaceutical industry. More-
over, he will be enjoined from doing so by the need to
observe the federal Conflict of Interest Act, the Ethical
Guidelines for Public Office Holders and the Guidelines for
the Political Activities of Public Office Holders. He will be
required to remove himself from discussions at Governing
Council in which he, his company or the pharmaceutical
industry has a vested interest.9
Critics, on the other hand, argue that having an active
employee of a health-related commercial entity appointed to
CIHR’s Governing Council presents an unmanageable conflict
of interest. The appointee’s primary obligation to shareholders
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Key points
• The appointment of Dr. Bernard Prigent to the Governing
Council of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research has
generated substantial debate in the worlds of health,
research, government and ethics.
• Critics of the appointment argue that having someone
from the pharmaceutical industry on the council presents
an unmanageable conflict of interest.
• An important precept borrowed from administrative
law — the concept of reasonable apprehension of bias —
may lend focus to ethical considerations in this situation.
• Application of this concept of bias leads to the perspective
that Dr. Prigent’s appointment is untenable because his
links to the pharmaceutical industry, and to Pfizer
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means that he cannot detach himself from the role of corporate
representative, nor act in a disinterested fashion. The funda-
mental concern is the shaping of the research agenda in favour
of the interests of the pharmaceutical  industry.10
Second, it is argued that Dr. Prigent is tainted by the inter-
national track record of his employer, Pfizer, insofar as he has
not publicly distanced himself from the company’s wrong -
doing.2 If he can be appointed to the Governing Council “as
an individual,” presumably he can speak out against wrong-
doing “as an individual.” Pfizer recently agreed to a $2.3 bil-
lion settlement of a lawsuit for its misleading advertising,
$1.3 billion of which was in settlement of criminal charges.11
This was the latest in a series of four occasions on which
Pfizer admitted to, and paid fines as a result of legal actions
against, its unsavoury business practices.6
Third, by removing himself from any discussions at Gov-
erning Council in which Pfizer, or the pharmaceutical indus-
try, has a vested interest, Dr. Prigent will be absent from virtu-
ally all of the discussions in which he might have significant
knowledge to convey. The perceived value of his appointment
will thus be diminished or lost.12
Fourth, the international trend is toward greater distancing
between the pharmaceutical industry and the broader research
community in response to the unveiling of scandalous prac-
tices by the pharmaceutical industry, such as active suppres-
sion of negative research results and hiding important safety
and effectiveness data. The US National Institutes of Health
has strengthened its conflict of interest policy on indepen-
dence from industry;13 it does not have a pharmaceutical rep-
resentative on its board.
This brief summary of the proponents’ and critics’ argu-
ments reveals perspectives worlds apart. An issue unexplored
thus far in the debate is a concept borrowed from administra-
tive law: the precept of reasonable apprehension of bias.
Administrative law concerns the rules by which public deci-
sion-makers — those who derive their powers from statute or
from royal prerogative — fulfil their roles.14 Arguments by the
critics have thus far been shaped around the topic of conflict of
interest, which focuses on whether one has a pecuniary interest
in a particular outcome of a decision. Conflict of interest is a
subset of the topics of bias and independence. Thus, even if a
direct pecuniary interest is not at play, decisions may be chal-
lenged on the basis of apparent bias or lack of independence.
The concept of reasonable apprehension of bias is an
inquiry as to what an informed member of the public, one
step removed from the situation, would think of the possibil-
ity for inappropriate factors to influence an appointee’s
decision-making on a given topic. It was developed historically
in the context of tribunals and other bodies serving in a judi-
cial or quasi-judicial capacity. However, it has also been
determined by the Supreme Court of Canada to apply more
broadly to those exercising administrative functions such as
selecting among competing applications to construct a
pipeline15 or those performing a policy-making function such
as deciding on and ordering decontamin -
ation measures.16 The latter — the devel-
opment of policy — constitutes the task
of the CIHR Governing Council. Differ-
ent standards apply depending on the
type of function being challenged: the
requirements “… depend upon the nature
and the function of the particular tri-
bunal.”17 The more quasi-judicial the
role, the stricter the standard to be ap -
plied.18 Also, the concept of reasonable
apprehension of bias is generally applied
in administrative law retrospectively to a
decision. In other words, once a decision is made or a tri-
bunal struck to determine a given matter, one of the parties
argues that the ultimate decision cannot be viewed as impar-
tial owing to apprehension of bias.
The argument I am making is not that a court challenge to
the appointment of Dr. Prigent would likely succeed on a claim
of reasonable apprehension of bias. This would be remarkable
given that it is an appointment and not a particular decision
being challenged, and that this is a policy-making body and
therefore not the usual focus of such a claim. Rather, I argue
that the concept of reasonable apprehension of bias is of use in
directing our thinking to relevant ethical considerations.
To determine whether there is a reasonable apprehension
of bias, one should ask “Would a reasonable person, knowing
the facts, believe that the member may be influenced by
improper considerations to favour one side?”19 For example,
in one case, a zoning decision of a municipal board was nulli-
fied because one member of the board owned property in an
area that arguably may have experienced an increase in prop-
erty values because of the decision.20 It matters not whether
the person is actually biased or whether he or she is able in
practice to detach his or her personal interests from decision-
making in a given capacity. The focus shifts from the quali-
ties of the individual to the perceptions of the reasonable out-
side observer. The test is whether the observer, apprised of
the facts, would assess the circumstance to carry the potential
of bias based on the decision-maker’s particular position. This
test was described by Justice de Grandpré of the Supreme
Court of Canada (in dissent, but this description of the test has
since been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada21) :
[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reason-
able and rightminded people, applying themselves to the question and
obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court
of Appeal, that test is “what would an informed person, viewing the
matter realistically and practically — and having thought the matter
through — conclude.22
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Analysis
If an outside observer would reasonably
suspect undue influence on the part of
the appointee by virtue of his or her con-
flicting obligations, the appointment
should not be made.
Analysis
The doctrine of reasonable apprehension of bias is useful
because it takes attention away from the question of whether,
for instance, Dr. Prigent is an upstanding individual, and
instead asks what the well-informed public, one step re -
moved, would think of his appointment. Would there be rea-
sonable grounds for concern about the potential for inappro-
priate influence on the part of Dr. Prigent in his service on the
Governing Council based on his corporate ties?
Whether one is just a single voice among many is viewed
as irrelevant, because it is assumed that the individual will
have had an impact on the decision. And it doesn’t matter
whether the decision reached was correct or unimpeachable;
the potentially corrupting influence poisons the process.
Just as the CIHR is intended to be at arm’s length from
government influence, so too should it be at arm’s length
from the pharmaceutical industry in order to remove the rea-
sonable apprehension of bias by the observer. It is vital that
trust in our public institutions not be further eroded.
Therein lies the heart of my argument: the public expects
decision-makers to be free of undue influence not only from
government but also from the corporate sector, in this case the
pharmaceutical industry. Failure to respect this expectation
undermines societal trust that is so vital to building and pre-
serving confidence in public institutions.
In appointments to boards, there is latitude for the need to
include individuals with expertise in a particular sector. It
would be inappropriate not to take advantage of the skills and
knowledge of specialists in a given area. The CIHR Act speci-
fies that the Governor in Council is to consider the appoint-
ment of members who reflect a range of relevant backgrounds
and disciplines. Indeed, because CIHR has commercialization
and economic development as parts of its mandate, the council
has had, and continues to have, representation from the com-
mercial sector. However, it may be that the appointment of an
individual from the pharmaceutical industry is too close for
comfort. More certainly, a person currently employed in the
higher echelons of a pharmaceutical company cannot function
free of the possible taint of reasonable apprehension of bias.
To illustrate an application of the concept of reasonable
apprehension of bias, consider Dr. Prigent’s role as a regis-
tered lobbyist with the Office of the Commissioner of Lobby-
ing of Canada to lobby various institutions, including CIHR,
in the promotion of Pfizer’s interests.23 Dr. Prigent may argue,
his supporters may argue, and those responsible for his Order-
in-Council appointment may argue that he can change hats
from lobbyist to public servant on any given day. However,
although this claim may be factually accurate, it doesn’t mat-
ter. If an outside observer would reasonably suspect undue
influence on the part of the appointee by virtue of his or her
conflicting obligations, the appointment should not be made.
It is the apprehension of a potential bias that counts. Justice
must not only be done; it must be seen to be done. Why wait
for a particular decision of a board to be challenged on the
basis of reasonable apprehension of bias? In furthering this
notion, the US administration is currently removing registered
lobbyists from advisory boards.13
When all is said and done, alas, the newly constructed
bridge between the pharmaceutical industry and CIHR brings
the parties far too close for  comfort.
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